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E xpression is often the target of some form of attack, but most legal systems, reflecting the recognition that threats to expression pose 
significant risks to societies and to individuals, respond to 
those attacks with heightened judicial and political 
scrutiny.
Recently, however, new threats to expression are 
emerging that are not identified as affecting speech and 
often, in fact, involve no conscious targeting of expression 
by a government prosecutor or civil litigant. As 
industrialized economies have grown more information- 
dependent, new laws, and new applications and 
interpretations of existing laws, increasingly treat 
information as property or invest individuals with 
property-like rights in data. Although often motivated by 
laudable goals, these efforts to create and expand property 
rights in information pose a significant threat to 
information flows, and therefore to citizens and
consumers.
Unfortunately, there are many examples: expanding the 
law of trademark to prohibit uses that create no likelihood 
of consumer confusion: allowing trademark holders to7 o
monopolize domain names and to displace others who 
wish to use those domain names for protest purposes; 
protecting names, images, voices, and even fictional 
characters not merely from uncompensated uses but even 
from open impersonation; extending rights of publicity to 
last 100 years or more after an individual's death.
Two areas of law, however, have accounted for the most 
sweeping commodification of information: copyright and 
privacy.
COPYRIGHT
In the United States, the Copyright Clause in the 
Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws 
to create an incentive for its creation. As the Supreme 
Court has written, copyright is "the engine of free 
expression. By establishing a marketplace right to the use 
of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas." (Harper S^Row 
Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985).)
The United Kingdom's first copyright law, the Statute of 
Anne, reflected a similar purpose, as suggested by its title, 
"An Act for the Encouragement of Learning." By breaking 
the bookseller's monopoly on disseminating printed 
expression, the Act created a great demand for new 
authors and material.
U.S. copyright law goes even further to prohibit the 
ownership of data. Instead, copyright law protects only 
expression. In the words of the unanimous Supreme 
Court: "The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is 
that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he 
narrates. . . .' [CJopyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely 
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
344-45, 349 (1991) (quoting Harper ^Row, 471 U.S. at 
556).)
Although it may seem unfair that the law does not allow 
a discoverer of data to own them, "this is not 'some 
unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme,'" the Court 
has written. "It is, rather, 'the essence of copyright,' and a
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constitutional requirement." (Id. at 349 (quoting Harper &. 
Row, 471 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (citations 
omitted).)
Recent changes to copyright laws threaten to expand the 
rights of copyright holders threaten to frustrate those laws' 
purpose.
Duration
Nowhere is this clearer than in the length of copyright 
protection. The duration of copyright in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom has grown from a 14-year
o o J
term, which could be renewed by the creator once, to life 
of the author plus 70 years today.
One might reasonably wonder whether 70 years of 
posthumous protection creates any additional incentive to 
create, while it defers for that much longer the moment 
when a work becomes part of the public domain. Lord 
Macaulay spoke to this issue in 1841 when Parliament was 
considering extending the term of British copyright 
protection to 21 years:
"Now, would the knowledge, that this copyright would exist 
in 1 841, have been a source of gratification to [Dr.] 
Johnson? Would it have stimulated his exertions? Would it 
have once drawn him out oj his bed before noon? . . . 
Would it have induced him to give us one more allegory, 
one more life of a poet . . .? Ijirmly believe not. . . . Show 
me that the prospect of this boon roused him to any 
vigorous effort, or sustained his spirits under depressing 
circumstances, and I am quite willing to pay the price of 
such an object, heavy as that price is. But what I do 
complain of is that my circumstances are to be worse, and 
Johnson 'sjdre none the better, that I am to give Jive pounds 
Jor what to him was not worth ajarthing. " 56 Parl. Deb. 
H.C (3d Ser.) 341, 349-50 (1841) (statement of 
Thomas Macaulay).
Scope
Legislatures have also aggressively expanded the scope of 
copyright. In the United States, to qualify for protection 
today, a work must be only "fixed" that is, captured in 
some "tangible medium of expression" and "original"  
meaning only "independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works)." (Feist Publications, 
499 U.S. at 345.) No intent to copyright, no notice of 
copyright, no publication, and no application to the 
government are necessary. This has expanded 
exponentially the number of works subject to copyright, 
and removed that much more expression from the public 
domain. Copyright law now protects plots, characters, 
choreography, basketball plays, page numbers, the
selection and arrangement of otherwise uncopyrightableo r j o
facts, sculpture, esthetic shapes, architecture, the "look 
and feel" of computer programs, voice mail messages, and 
doodles.
Rights
Congress and Parliament have also broad created new 
rights for copyright holders. The U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act prohibits the circumvention of 
technological measures taken by copyright owners to 
control access to their works even in those works are not 
protected by federal copyright law or include facts and 
ideas which cannot be protected with copyright law. (Pub. 
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. paras. 101 et seq).)
Similarly, the new Act prohibits the removal or 
alteration of "copyright management information"  
information conveyed with a copyrighted work that 
identifies the author or performer and the terms and 
conditions for the use of the work. Yet it is often 
impossible or impractical to include the copyright notice 
when parodying a song, quoting a book, or videotaping a 
television program for later \iewing. While the Supreme 
Court has ruled that all three of these activities are 
legitimate uses of copyrighted work, under the defense of 
"fair use," the failure to include the complete original 
copyright notice could nevertheless subject the user to 
statutory fines as great as $25,000 per incident, 
injunctions, damages, costs, and attorney's fees, and even 
criminal prosecution.
Finally, providers of Internet access must "respond 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material 
that is claimed to be infringing."(/J. para. 512(c)) Think 
what this means: To avoid liability, a service provider must 
remove the material stored on its servers by its customers 
before any adjudication that the material is infringing or 
that the infringement is not excused by a defense under the 
copyright law. The law thus creates a tremendous incentive 
to turn service providers into copyright censors, blocking 
access to material that may ultimately prove to be wholly 
lawful.
Europe has gone even further with its directive on the 
legal protection of databases. The "database right" protects 
"[a] collection of independent works, data or other 
materials which (a) are arranged in a systematic or 
methodical way, and (b) are individually accessible," 
whether or not by electronic means. (Copyright Designs 
and Patents Act of 1988 para. 3A (as amended by the 
Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulation (1997)).) 
All that is required is that there has been a substantial 
investment in obtaining, verifying, or presenting the 
contents of the database, and that the creator be located in 
the European Economic Area.
The database right prevents the extraction or re- 
utilization of all or a substantial part, or the repeated and 
systematic extraction or re-utilization of an insubstantial 
part, of the database. Ironically, "re-utilization" of the 
contents of a database is defined as "making those contents
o
available to the public by any means" the very purpose
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that copyright law was intended to serve. The protection 
lasts for 15 years, but may be extended indefinitely if die 
contents of the database are substantially revised or 
updated.
That protection was still further extended by the 2001 
British Horseracing Board case, in which the High Court 
found that William Hill's use of information from the 
British Horseracing Board's database violated United 
Kingdom law, even though it was available from othero ' o
sources, not because the amount taken was quantitatively 
substantial, but because it was qualitatively important. The 
Court of Appeal has referred questions from this case to 
the European Court of Justice, but left the High Court's 
decision standing. (British Horseracing Board Ltd. and Others 
v. William Hill Organization Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ 1268 (3 1 
July 2001).)
By granting ownership rights in actual data the facts 
that describe the reality of our existence, facts which may 
be discovered, but not created the database right would 
not only be unconstitutional under U.S. law, but anathema 
to the historical concept of facts and ideas as part of the 
common heritage of humankind. Nevertheless, powerful 
industry lobbies have introduced legislation to create some 
form of database protection in each of the past five 
Congresses, so that historical conception is under attack 
even in the United States.
Contracts
Finally, contract law is supplanting copyright law as a 
source of rights for protecting works, particularly in the 
digital environment. Database providers have long relied 
on contracts to govern access to, and control reuse of,o 7 '
material contained in their databases. Copyright holders 
license almost all software, subject to contract terms, 
rather than sell it outright. And this trend recently gained
o ^ o
support in the United States with adoption of the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act. That Act reflects 
a concerted effort to use mass market licenses, instead of 
copyright law, for all transfers of "computer information 
transactions" not only software, but "electronically 
disseminated" news, opinions, pictures, and the like. 
(Hannibal Travis, "Pirates of the Information 
Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First 
Amendment," 15 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 111, 840 
(2000), and sources cited therein.)
These licenses are used to protect rights that go far 
beyond those provided by copyright law. They can restrict 
the use of facts or ideas. They can last indefinitely. They 
can be used to limit criticism or the development of new 
and competing materials. They seldom provide for any of 
the defenses included in copyright law, and they often 
include penalties and conditions far more severe than 
those provided by copyright law. Contracts are proving to 
be an important means for controlling access to 
information.
Collectively, these changes in copyright law greatly 
expand the rights of copyright holders and provide them 
with the legal tools to prevent access to, or use of, the 
contents of copyrighted works altogether. Legal scholars 
have described these developments as an "intellectual 
land-grab" (James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual 
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?," 47 Duke Law 
Journal 87, 94 (1997).) and a "creeping enclosure of the 
inlormational commons." (Peter Jazi & Martha 
Woodmansee, The Construction of Authorship 11 (1994).) 
Unchecked they threaten the public's ability to access and 
use information.
PRIVACY
Another area in which information flows are being 
threatened by new laws and a new focus on property-like 
rights is that of information privacy.
The past decade has witnessed a surge in legislation,r o o '
regulation, and litigation designed to protect the privacy of 
personal information. Although this started in Europe, 
with adoption of the EU data protection directive, it is 
catching on in the United States.
o
The dominant trend in these recent enactments is to 
invest consumers with near absolute control over 
information in the marketplace irrespective of whether 
the information is, or could be, used to cause harm. 
Virtually all of die privacy bills pending before Congress 
reflect this goal: "To strengthen control by consumers" and 
"to provide greater individual control.'1 '' (S. 30, 107th Cong. 
para. 2 (2001); H.R. 89, 107th Cong. para. 2(b)(l) 
(2001); H.R. 347, 107th Cong. para. 2(b)(l)(A) (2001) 
(emphasis added)). William Safire summed up this 
movement towards turning information into property 
when he wrote in the 'New York Times: "Your bank account, 
your health record, your genetic code, your personal and 
shopping habits and sexual interests are your own 
business. That information has value. If anybody wants to 
pay for an intimate look inside your life, let them make you 
an offer and you'll think about it." (William Safire, "Nosy 
Parker Eives," New York Times, Sept. 23, 1999, at A29.)
These new enactments do exactly that. The data 
protection directive, for example, conditions the 
collection, storage, use, or transfer of personal data on 
providing affected individuals with notice, obtaining their 
consent, providing them with access and an opportunity to 
correct disputed data, registering with national data 
protection authorities, and complying with other 
procedural and substantive requirements. U.S. laws, while 
imposing fewer restrictions on data processing, are moving 
in this direction, and are being vigorously, aggressively 
enforced.
"The difficulty," as Professor Eugene Volokh has 
written, "is that the right to information privacy my 
right to control your communication of personally
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identifiable information about me is a right to have the
o
government stop you from speaking about me." (Eugene 
Volokh, "Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From 
Speaking About You," 52 Stanford Law Review 1049, 1050- 
5 1, 2000.) Expanding the realm of information over which 
the law allows individuals to exercise control without 
regard for harm threatens the availability of information 
that is critical to expression.
Moreover, the debate over these laws has largely ignored 
their impact on expression. In the United States, rather 
than striking down laws like these that threaten access to, 
and communication of, information, die Supreme Court 
has endorsed them as legitimate economic regulation. In 
an unanimous opinion upholding the Drivers Privacy 
Protection Act, the Court wrote that "the personal, 
identifying information that the [law] regulates is a 'thing 
in interstate commerce,'" and referred to that information 
throughout its opinion simply as "an article in interstate 
commerce," like a truckload of coal or steel. (Condon v 
Reno, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (quoting United States v 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995)). This stands in 
stark contrast to the considerable protection that the 
Court has interpreted the First Amendment as applying to 
expression.
THE NEED FOR BALANCE
These developments in privacy and copyright law are 
troubling for at least four reasons.
First, they have very practical consequences for citizens' 
use of information to monitor public officials and the 
activities of our government. Without access to
o
information and the freedom to express ourselves, citizens 
cannot elect their leaders and oversee the activities of the 
government. As James Madison wrote almost two 
centuries ago: "A popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue 
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. ... A people who 
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves 
with the power which knowledge gives." (James Madison, 
Letter to WT. Barry, 4 August 1822, reprinted in 9 The 
Writing of James Madison 10 (Hunt ed. 1910)). The consent 
of the governed is the only legitimate source of sovereign 
power in a democracy, and it is only meaningful if 
informed.
A recent study by Professor Brooke Barnett found that 
U.S. journalists routinely use records, including those 
restricted by the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, not 
merely to check facts, but to actually identify the story in 
the first place. According to that study, 64 per cent of all 
crime-related stories, 57 per cent of all city or state stories, 
56 per cent of all investigative stories, and 47 per cent of 
all political campaign stories rely on public records. Access 
to public record databases, Professor Barnett writes, is "a
necessity for journalists to uncover wrongdoing and 
effectively cover crime, political stories and investigative 
pieces." (Brooke Barnett, "Use of Public Record 
Databases in Newspaper and Television Newsrooms," 53
Federal Communications Law journal 557 (2001) (emphasis 
added).)
A 2001 High Court case suggests the impediment that
o oo 1
the expansion of copyright and privacy law can pose to 
informing the public. When the Sunday Telegraph 
published a confidential minute recording a meeting 
between Tony Blair, Paddy Ashdown, and others at 10 
Downing Street, Ashdown sued, claiming not that the
o ' ' o
minute was inaccurate or defamatory, but rather that its 
publication violated his copyright as its author. The High 
Court agreed, rejecting the Sunday Telegraph's claim that 
the publication was immunized by the protections for 
expression in the 1998 Human Rights Act. (Ashdown v 
Telegraph Group Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ 1142 (18 July 
2001)).
Second, the expansion of copyright and privacy law 
interferes with valuable commercial uses of information. 
Open information flows facilitate what courts have called a 
"marketplace of ideas." (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). The marketplace is more than 
a metaphor: markets depend on information flows. 
Economists have long regarded access to information as
o o
one of the requirements of a competitive market, and the 
practical absence of such information as an inefficiency.
Allowing individuals to exercise control over
o
information, in the absence of any specific threat of harm, 
has economic consequences, because data are used 
extensively in the market. Ubiquitous credit reports in the 
United States, for example, mean that Americans are 
judged based on their own credit history and 
qualifications, not stereotypes based on where they live, 
how old they are, or the color of their skin.
Those records have literally transformed the financial 
services sector. Banks, credit card issuers, insurers, and 
others make more services available to more people, on a 
more equitable basis, and at lower cost than ever before. A 
2000 World Bank study showed that restrictive privacy 
laws would eliminate 11 out of every 100 people who 
currently qualify for mortgages, credit cards, and other 
loans. (John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of 
Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience (2000)).
Accessible credit records increase the speed with which 
credit decisions are made. In 1997, 82 per cent of 
automobile loan applicants received a decision within an 
hour; 48 per cent of applicants received a decision within 
30 minutes. Many retailers open new charge accounts for 
customers at the point of sale in less than two minutes. 
The greater accuracy, speed, and efficiency of the credit
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system, and the greater confidence of lenders, also drives 
down the cost of credit by an estimated $80 billion per 
year for U.S. mortgages alone. (Walter F. Kitchenman, U.S. 
Credit Reporting: Perceived Benefits Outweigh Privacy Concerns 7 
(The Tower Group 1999)).
These benefits derive from the fact that information is 
obtained routinely, over time, without consumers having 
control over the information. Allowing the consumer to 
block the collection or use of unfavorable information 
would make the credit report and other public and 
commercial records useless. As Federal Trade Commission 
Timothy Muris has noted: "If consent were required, and 
consumers could decide on a creditor-by-creditor 
basis whether they wanted their information reported, 
the system would collapse." (Timothy J. Muris, Protecting 
Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, Privacy 2001 
Conference, Cleveland, OH, 4 October 2001).
Open access to personal information is also critical to 
competition, by helping to level the playing field for new- 
market entrants. Laws designed to protect privacy, Robert 
E. Litan, Director of the Economic Studies Program and 
Vice President of the Brookings Institution, has written, 
"raise barriers to entry by smaller, and often more 
innovative, firms and organizations." (Robert E. Eitan, 
Balancing Costs and Benefits of New Privacy Mandates, Working 
Paper 99-3, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies (1999).)
A third reason to care about the impact of granting 
property-like rights in information is that those rights 
interfere with other beneficial uses of information, such as 
to foster individual development and self-fulfillment, 
further creativity and innovation, advance science, and 
promote social evolution.
Many of those benefits transcend either political or 
economic considerations. For example, the development 
of new medical treatments and drugs depends on the 
widespread availability of information. Helena Gail 
Rubenstein has written that "Privacy, which is intertwined 
widi the concept of control over what is disseminated 
about oneself, is an expression of autonomy. . . . [WJhile 
autonomy is an appropriate framework for evaluating 
questions concerning the treatment of one's body, it is not 
the appropriate framework for evaluating rules to regulate 
the use of health data." (Helena Gail Rubinstein, "If I am 
Only for Myself, What Am I? A Communitarian Eook at 
the Privacy Stalemate," 25 American Journal of Law and 
Medicine 203, 226 (1999)). Rubenstein concludes: "As 
individuals rely on their right to be let alone, they shift the 
burden for providing the data needed to advance medical 
and health policy information. Their individualist vision 
threatens the entire community." (Id. at 226.)
Eaw enforcements' efforts to identify and bring to 
justice the terrorists who attacked the Pentagon and World
Trade Center, and to protect against future attacks, also 
demonstrate vividly the value of information. In the days 
after the terrorist attacks, officials sought information on 
suspects and their accomplices from hundreds of sources, 
including credit card companies, banks, airlines, rental car 
agencies, flight training schools, and thousands of private 
individuals. It rapidly became clear that personal 
information collected by the private sector was a 
significant resource in the campaign to track down the 
perpetrators and prevent future attacks.
Finally, these recent developments in copyright and 
privacy law warrant thoughtful debate precisely because 
they pose a largely invisible and therefore insidious threat 
to expression. Unlike direct attacks on expression, which 
courts have almost uniformly repelled, efforts to create 
ownership and control of information are far more subtle. 
Motivated by changes in markets and technologies, and 
especially the growth in the information services economy, 
these efforts to commodify data, and thereby restrict their 
use, are rarely even seen as a threat to traditionally 
protected expression interests. So few constitutional or 
foundational objections have been raised, and courts are 
only occasionally sympathetic when they are.
It is ironic that these developments in copyright and 
privacy law reflect almost opposite objectives. Businesses 
have lobbied Parliament and Congress and litigated
o o
aggressively to expand the monopoly granted them by 
copyright law and thereby exact greater compensation 
from individuals who wish to use copyrighted works and 
the information they contain. Recent privacy laws, by 
contrast, reflect an effort to give individuals greater control 
of the information about them that businesses wish to 
collect and use. Both efforts, however, have the effect of 
creating property-like rights in information that threaten 
to choke critical information flows.
Recognizing that threat does not necessarily mean that 
laws creating greater control over information are 
universally undesirable or should always be repudiated. 
Rather, it sets the stage for balancing laws that restrict7 o o
information flows with the legitimate need for, and legal 
protection of, those flows. Where the former are necessary 
to respond to sufficiently significant harms or generate 
sufficiently great benefits, the latter may have to give way. 
But we should reach that conclusion explicitly, carefully, 
and reluctantly. @
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